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I think I finally understand.
Spezio and Aurillia come to Seattle after the 93-win 2003 season, replacing Carlos Guillen and Cirillo (and McLemore, who also collapsed in 2003). 
Aurillia has a terrible 261 AL ABs and is traded back to the NL, where he hit again.  It wasn't changing leagues or coming to a 93 win team that collapsed to only win 63 ... it was the park that did him in ... the park where he had an OPS 8 points *HIGHER* than his road OPS.  (.671 to .663). 
Spezio, managed 415 PAs in 2004 and another 51 in 2005 before departing.  In 2004, he hit great for two months, then tanked the rest of the season, (a pattern eerily similar to Guti).  But, looking further, Sepzio *ALSO* had a higher OPS (only 5 points) .637 to .632 at HOME than he did on the road.
I don't know.  Maybe my logic is flawed ... but, I just have this inexplicable belief that if a PARK is killing a hitter, then one would expect that hitter to hit worse in that PARK.
In truth, once upon a time, I believed in the Safeco myth -- and attributed Sexson's destruction to the evils of the Safe.  But, upon further reflection, the problem was NEVER Safeco.  The problem is in the basic dangers of the baseball mercenary.  When you rent a player, who has ZERO organizational investment, then you set yourself up for players to blame the org (or park) for their personal failures.  Cirillo, Spezio, Aurillia, even Sexson and Beltre all have one thing in common other than being right-handed.  They were mercenaries. 
Gutz, on the other hand, was given his FIRST full-time chance at MLB success with Seattle. 
Funny thing that Edgar and Boone and even Cameron never had problems with Safeco.
"Signed as FA".  That seems every bit as common as "right-handed" when Identifying the "safeco killed" guys.  Of course, two of the three you bring up showed up for the 30 win swoon of 2004 ... and Gutz, just like Spezio, got off to a torrid start, and only slumped horribly after the club tanked.  (Then again, Aurillia hit .715 in the 2nd half after hitting .641 in the first half, so go figure).
"How would I know I'm wrong?" the Doc asks.
1) If a player hits BETTER at Safeco then elsewhere, the problem, whatever it may be, is not likely to be Safeco.
2) What's the ratio of players this impacts to those it doesnt?
3) How many PAs for these players are avialable? (what's the sample size being examined?)
Imagine this for a minute.
In 2005, Beltre comes in and hits .716 (93 OPS+).  If he had been IMMEDIATELY traded, and hit .792 (105) at his next stop, would his performance have been 100% attributed to park effect?  I say it would've been.  Because the primary foundation for the Safeco Effect killing hitters is tied up in 3 hitters (Cirillo, Spezio and Aurillia), who lasted 800, 500, and 250 ABs and were gone, (and two of those hitters were here in the midst of the 2004 collapse).
If the park is to blame at all - it is at best, IMO, a mitigating factor.  The real blame is in acquiring players who are such mental weaklings that they crumble and quit in response to the first hardship.  Kotchman was not right-handed.  The park isn't supposed to kill lefties.  But, Kotchman was a guy whose entire profile screams "I'm fine until something doesn't go my way."
It's players with the Emotional IQ of a 2-year-old that crumble in Seattle.  But, with an organization that hasn't produced a decent hitter (outside of Lopez) in a decade, why blame the park.  Kotchman imploded.  Vidro imploded, (another switch hitter).  Wilkerson imploded.  Clement failed miserably.  Reed failed miserably.  (But, somehow, Guillen was completely immune from the effects of Safeco in his one year stay).  Bradley is another switch-hitter who imploded.
As to the "you have to see how these guys looked" argument.  No, I don't.  I've seen PLENTY of completely distraught teams, (I watched the Braves since the 70s, so I saw 2 decades of last place teams).  Guess what.  LOTS of players in lots of parks look utterly hopeless when they're 30 games back.