In 2010, Dan Haren was the highest paid dBack with an 8.5 million salary. In 2011, Jason Marquis at 7.5 million. Based on what I can see, Arizona's payroll went from $60 million to $67 from '10 to '11. Their offense went from 94 to 99 OPS+ and the only lineup change was LaRoche was dropped for Juan Miranda. The most significant FA pickup was JJ Putz for $4 million. Arizona is an argument to *NOT* spend on Fielder.
But, you contend that getting a top 10 hitter in baseball will help your club *a lot*, despite the fact that you yourself throw a laundry list out that goes completely contrary to that conclusion.
Let's take the counter argument to losing AROD and Griffey.
Texas 2000: 848-974 run differential and 71 wins, and they pick up AROD, who not only was a top bat, but also a top glove at the most important defensive position. In 2001, 890-968 and 73 wins.
In 1999, Cinci with Cameron won 96 games with a run differential of 865-711. In 2000 with Griffey they won 85 with a 825-765 run differential.
Am I the only one who finds it disturbing that it is soooo easy to find examples of "superstar" hitters moving to clubs and showing zero (or close to zero) evidence of actually making things better? Honestly, I've watched baseball for 40+ years ... and off the top of my head, I cannot recall *ANY* case where a poor team (sub .500), acquired a "big bat", and turned the franchise around. None. I've gotta believe it's happened somewhere along the line and I just can't call it up. But, I know some worst-to-first teams, (the Braves snagged Pendleton to begin their run). But, none of the ones I know of were turned based on acquiring a known big BAT. (I have previously noted that I think things work differently with pitcher acquisitions).
Okay, I did a little research and found one. Bonds. San Fran went 72-90 with a 574-647 run differential the year before they got Bonds. They won 103 in his first year, (but actually finished 2nd to the Braves and didn't make the playoffs). The club wouldn't make the playoffs until Bonds' 5th year with them and wouldn't make the Series, (which they lost), until his 10th.
Fielder is no Bonds. Before steroids, Bonds was an 8-10 WAR guy. After steroids, Bonds was a 10-12 WAR guy. What Seattle fans don't get about Griffey/Cameron is that while Griffey WAS a 9-WAR guy in his prime, his decline began BEFORE he went to Cinci.
1996 - 9.7
1997 - 9.4
1998 - 6.1
1999 - 4.8
That's his last four years in Seattle. He gave Cinci a 5.8 his first season, but only managed a 2.0 WAR one more time in his entire career.
Cameron's last year in Cinci and 4 in Seattle?
1999 - 5.4
2000 - 3.9
2001 - 6.4
2002 - 3.4
2003 - 5.3
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Final point about where the Seattle offense stands today. If one sorts all AL batters by WAR, who was the top Win provider for Seattle in 2011? Brendan Ryan at 2.8 just nudges out Ackley (because he played more games). But the reason is "feels" like someone like Fielder is worth more than he really is - is that we hold onto the version of players at their peak. If I say AROD, most people would assume that, while he's not as good as he used to be, he's still a star player. Brendan Ryan was ranked 43rd in WAR ... AROD 45th for 2011. But, because of his position and better defense and because he stayed healthy, Brendan Ryan was more valuable.
People don't think of Teixeira as worth less than Melky Cabrera. But in 2011, he was. Heck, Kotchman was worth more than Teixeira.
The most valuable every day player for Seattle in 2011 was Brendan Ryan. Does that sound like an offense where Fielder can put them over the top? Or does that sound more like the 2004 offense ... where bringing in Sexson and Beltre netted one extra run scored the next year?
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