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Anaheim and Texas and Oakland won every AL West title during the last decade.
NONE of those teams required a "premiere" FA signing to get to the post-season for the *FIRST* time.
Anaheim (2002) - won WS.  Payroll = $61 million (8th in AL).  Texas and Seattle ranked 3rd and 4th in payroll that season.  Didn't add Vlad until 2004.
Oakland (2000) - Started run of 3 titles in 4 years in 2000 with a $33 million payroll (11th in AL). 
Texas (2010) - Reached WS.  Payroll = $55 million (14th of 14 in AL).
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In point of fact, Texas wasted almost a decade at the bottom of the AL West after signing the biggest FA contract of all time with AROD.
You can *get* good without expensive contracts.  You cannot *stay good* without expensive contracts. 
No team in the history of free agency has *required* a high priced FA acquisition in order to compete.  While it can help and work out (Detroit with Pudge, Mags and Cabrera), it can also hurt, (Texas with AROD, Cinci with Junior). 
It should be noted that Anaheim trailed only Boston and NY in payroll in 2011.  They failed to make the playoffs, (as did Boston).  Anaheim spent $46 million more than Texas did in 2011, yet Texas won the West easily. 
In the last three years in the AL specifically, teams that failed to make the playoffs in year X were more likely to make the playoffs the following year when payroll DROPPED than when it increased. 
AL Teams that made playoffs after missing playoffs previous year since 2008:
2009: Yankees (-$6 to $201), Twins (+$9 to $65)2010: Texas (-$19 to $55), Tampa (+8 to $71)2011: Detroit (-$17 to $105)
After making the playoffs in 2009, Boston increased payroll by $40 million and missed the playoffs in both 2010 and 2011.  The Angels increased payroll from $113 in 2009 (last playoff year) to $138 in 2011, and failed to make the playoffs in either '10 or '11.
Teixeira in 2009 is the only case where a "premiere" FA bat was added to a team that missed the playoffs and that team made the playoffs the following season.  Second to that was the VMart in Detroit.  However, in both cases (Tex and VMart), the aggregate payroll dropped between the two seasons.
The panic and certainty of the dominance of Texas and Anaheim based on their 2012 roster changes is still "speculative".  There were many who pegged Seattle to compete for the post season immediately after signing Cliff Lee.  Last season, Boston was considered an absolute lock for the AL East title after signing AGON and Crawford, while the Yankees scoured the discard bin for guys like Garcia and Colon.
GETTING good is about flexibility and development.  STAYING good is about willingness to spend.  The reason they work differently is that when developing talent, teams naturally maintain maximum flexibility.  If Saunders fails, in comes Peguero, then Halman, then Carp.  But, if you sign even Civics to even modestly pricey contracts, the ability to be flexible vanishes.  It is simply not possible (politically or logistically or financially) to routinely pay someone 8 figures to ride the bench.  Sexson WILL stay in the lineup for a long time while failing.  Figgins WILL stay in the lineup a long time while failing.
Was there ever, at any point in time during 2011 even the remotest of possiblities that Carp or Trayvon or Casper was going to supplant Ichiro in RF and relegate Ichiro to the bench?  Ichiro did not play 161 games while hitting .645 because of his ability.  He played 161 games because he has the biggest contract in the lineup.  Figgins played 161 games in 2010.  He hit .484 and still managed to play 81 games in 2011 (which would've been more if they hadn't sent him to the DL after August 1st).
A $1 million Kotchman or Langerhans or Kennedy can be discarded and replaced immediately if necessary.  An $8 million multi-year guy cannot.  The "developing" (cheap) team has a massive edge in flexibility.  Almost any pleasant surprise can be leveraged to improve the team, and almost any dreadful player can be discarded and replaced (though positional depth of near-ready players is obviously critical in this regard). 
Anaheim has a great, relatively young lineup.  They spent big on Vernon Wells, who not only was the worst full-time player on the roster, he also still got 529 PAs.  If Brandon Woods fails, you can actually go out and pick up a Callaspo relatively cheap.  If your $32 or $50 or $80 million investment fails, you're stuck.  The best you can do is trade your dead weight for somebody else's dead weight and hope you get lucky.
Texas got good in 2010 because they dumped the $12 and $13 million they were spending on Millwood and Padilla and instead spent $5 and $6 on Harden and Vlad.  That 2010 club had ONE regular (Michael Young @ $13 million) who was making so much money he couldn't be benched if needed.  They had nearly complete lineup flexibility.  Once they settled on which players they could count on going forward, they committed dollars to keeping them and they committed dollars to bringing in talent where they were weak, (Beltre).
I'm not convinced that Seattle has actually figured out what kind of hitters actually work out well in Safeco, or how to effectively coach hitting there.  I think they are FAR more likely to figure that out by maintaining their lineup flexibility and rotating scads of young talent through the lineup until something goes click.  Me?  I contend that the big name, high priced FA signings that Texas and Anaheim are doing are what Seattle needs to be willing (and able) to do AFTER they figure out how to produce talent internally.  To date, it remains over a decade since Seattle produced a single .800 hitter.