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I have been contemplating the Baker article and your original response, figuring everyone would have moved on before I contributed. I appreciate the reset, but still do not have a crisp synthesis of my own. Instead, I will just add some points that I hope further the conversation.
1) Let me start by stating that the article beautifully makes your point that Armstrong and Lincoln are the core problem. I must admit that I had not been convinced previously. Didn't disagree, but was still on the fence.
2) Zduriencik had no chance. I clearly remember when Bazasi was fired and Zduriencik was hired, that Armstrong said that Bavasi had been given more freedom than previous GM's, so any notice that his failure was a sign of meddling couldn't be true. At the time, this caused some conceptual dissonance for me because I had been reading your persuasive characterization of committee decision making as a core weakness of the organization.
The speculated narrative now has clarity. Armstrong and Lincoln resented carrying the failure of a 'lesser man (Bavasi)', and became determined to hire someone green enough that he would not have the credibility to fight against their meddling. This is why Zduriencik had no chance. He was specifically chosen for two reasons. (1) He was in over his head and would not present viable opposition regarding the management of the MLB team and (2) he had credibility as a scouting director and would rebuild the minors.
I don't think Zduriencik is a bad guy. It is because he isn't a bad guy, that long time acquaintances like Fusco and Blengino are so disillusioned by Zduriencik's behavior. It rings true to me that the stress of being in over his head and struggling to stay afloat could be a clear origin of Zduriencik's bad behavior. Carmen Fusco was a lifelong friend that Zduriencik cut loose to save his job. If that were Zduriencek's true demeanor, don't you think it would have reared it head earlier in their relationship? Wouldn't Fusco have been disappointed, but not bitter about it?
3) The way you characterize middle management's role in an organization does not ring true to me.  Zduriencik's job is two fold: keep the people above happy and provide the people below the resources and space to do their jobs.  Zduriencik should be a buffer between Lincoln and Wedge, not a conduit.  In a successful organization, leadership sets the targets and the boundary conditions within which to pursue them (win baseball games without loosing money and without acquiring players convicted of sexual assault).  Firing Zduriencik for the Luecke acquistion could be justified; micromanaging the teaching of situational hitting, not so much.
4) I realize this could question could appear snarky, but I promise that is not the intent.  In addition to extensive consulting in high level executive settings, I presume you also spent many years working within F-500 companies?  The reason I ask, is my experience is that consultants get a very skewed view of organizational politics.  My experience is consultants are hired to appease management from above or they are hired by those who lack the conviction to act on their own impressions.  Granted, my experience is not F-500, but is a lot like Boeing where people lose their jobs when the billion dollar government contract goes elsewhere.
5) Blengino comes across as a foolishly naive -- he too appears to have been in over his head.
6) Zduriencik should be judged based on the product on the field.  It's not looking good, but he'll get another year.  I think there is zero chance Zduriencik is about to burst out of his cocoon and reveal himself as genus Gillick butterfly, but there is a minor chance that he invests MLB dollars in as close to sure things as exist in baseball (Robinson Cano and David Price), so that his expertise in amateur scouting and player development can be the difference maker.  That is how the Atlanta Braves and New York Yankees did it in the 90's.