With none out and a runner at third, you have two things happening that skew the data toward high run expectency:
1) You have three full outs to string together other offensive threats...your rally can survive two failures and still be producing runs. That matters a lot in a game where even the best teams fail 64% of the time (a .360 team OBP is rare and very...very productive)
2) Generally, 0 out, runner at third implies that the pitcher is doing worse than 1 out runner runner at third. Believe it or not, the net ERA for pitchers who find themselves in the former situation (for their entire appearance...not just that inning) is more than 1.5 runs worse than the net ERA for the pitchers who find themselves in the 1 out runner at 3rd scenario.
Good read, as usual, from Geoff Baker on the fact that the M's are moving runners over less often than other teams.
We especially like Geoff's clear, clean writing as it pertains to (low) assumption of audience knowledge. He starts by explaining the difference between RISP and productive outs, and does so without conveying any impatience about having to do so.
Even when I know a subject like the back of my hand, I still prefer for a writer/speaker to use low assumption-of-knowledge. It helps me get my bearings quickly and hop up the ladder to more-organized thinking.
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Q. Are the Mariners scoring fewer runs and losing more games because they are "poor" at moving runners over with productive outs?
A. No way no how. At least, not in principle.
As any run-expectancy chart -- say, this run expectancy chart -- will tell you, a ballclub moves itself closer to a loss by grounding the ball to the right side, man on 2B and 0 out. Thusly:
- 0 on, man on 2B = 119 runs per 100 innings
- 1 on, man on 3B = 98 runs per 100 innings
We don't know how to make it any simpler than that. If the defense could make that swap every time 0 on, man on 2B occurred, it would save dozens of runs a year and win several more ballgames than it does.
Ceteris perebus, Dr. Lasker, a hitter who grounds out 4-3 and advances a runner is shooting his ballclub in the side of the head.
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Ya, we know that the run-scoring environments are a bit different now than in 1998-2002, and no, they're not enough to overthrow the underlying principles.
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Q. Why do teams believe in it, then? Baker suggests that good teams move runners over a lot. Doesn't SSI believe in manager intuition?
A. Two reasons, a minor one and a major one. The minor reason is: the first 100 years of MLB had much lower run-scoring environments, in which one run mattered much more often. The principle evolved in Asia, before we moved to Australia.
The major reason in a moment...
Manager intuition, by the way, is generally correct. But Earl Weaver, and many others, were screaming against the 4-3 groundout 40 years ago. And Miller Huggins never asked Babe Ruth or Lou Gehrig to move runners over.
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Geoff reports that failure to make productive outs is one of the things that is angering Don Wakamatsu right now:
What we're talking about here, and what frustrates manager Don Wakamatsu, is situational hitting. Because if you get a guy to third base with only one out, there are ways to score that runner without a hit.
You can hit a flyball and have the runner tag up. Hit a ground ball to the right side. You can put a squeeze play on. The flyball can often be the easiest way, which is why you'll see sinkerballers so effective late. In those cases, the offensive team can put a "contact play" on where the runner breaks for home on contact and will usually score if the ball is hit anywhere but third base.
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Q. Do other base/out situations merit the "productive out"?
A. Get a load of this one. If a ballclub led off with a triple, would it benefit from a sacrifice fly (SF) on the next play?
- 0 out, man on 3B = 148 runs per 100 innings
- 1 out, bases empty, and 1 run already cashed in = 130 runs per 100 innings
You just shot yourself in the foot again!
Weaver's Fourth Law: If You Play For One Run, That's All You Get. Don't go squandering your outs on single bases. You OPS .500 that way. (Well, y'know.)
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Q. Other situations?
A. With a runner on 3B, and 1 out, you actually do gain 0.14 runs by hitting a sac fly:
- 1 out, man on 3B = 98 runs per 100 innings
- 2 out, bases empty, and 1 run already cashed in = 112 runs per 100 innings.
The difference between this situation, and the previous one, is interesting. Maybe Matty can comment on why the math works the way it does, that giving up the out works with 1 out but not with none out.
But, in general, trading an out for a base -- even for home plate -- is doing the other team a favor.
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Comments
Good post, good subject.
I remember that decades ago James posted that the sacrifice bunt was a poor play in the total run-scoring scheme of things.
One thing to consider here is what the batting average and slugging percentage of somebody "trying to move over the runner on second " (hitting to the right side intentionally) is. I suppose there are some players who see no great drop in average when trying this. For them, I suppose, it COULD make sense. That would be a difficult # to accurately determine, however.
But, in the end, you only get 27 outs. Willingly giving them up rarely makes sense. And Matt hit that nail on the head in his point #1 above.
Playing small ball seems to make even less sense for a team struggling at the plate, like the Mariners. Giving up the out to get the runner to 2nd for a team that doesn't bring hitters to the plate with a relatively high ability to drive that runner home means, essentially, that you are wasting the AB of the first player.
It also illustrates why you need to have some power in the lineup. I wen't back and looked at Whitey Herzon'gs great Cardinal teams of the 80's. Of course, they were famous for being teams that picked you to death with a bunch of single and speed. It wasn't really quite the case. Check it out. Those lineups had pop...just not a bunch of homer pop.
In each World Series years of 82,85, & 87 the Cards fielded 4 positions where they got 40+ extra-base hits. In 82 and 85 they were actually middle of the pack in the NL in Slugging. (they led the league in OBP in each of those years)
In each of the years they had one "power hitter" who had some homes...but other guys who whacked doubles and more doubles.
In '82, Lonnie Smith had 51 x-base hits, George Hendrick 44 (with 19 taters), Keith Hernandez 46 and Porter/Tenace combined for 51 at the catcher's position.
In '85, Jack Clark haad 51 (22 homers), Tommy Herr 49, Willie McGee 54 and Andy VanSlyke had 44. the catchers combined for another 36.
In '87, Clark had 59 (35 homers), McGee had 59, Terry Pendleton had 45 and the Wizard of Oz had 44!
Even the most famous "small ball" successful lineup wasn't really a small ball lineup. those teams were in the upper heigths of run scoring those years. they didn't win 3-2 bunting runners along.
Over the course of those three years those teams had a total of 241 SH's. 122 of them were by pitchers. In 486 games they has 119 SH's by non-pitchers. Hardly bunt and run baseball.
The sac bunt or grounder to the right as an offensive strategy is a pretty poor one.
Look at it this way. Jose Lopez is having a terrible no good crappy year at the plate. He's grounded into 15(!) double plays. However, he still leads the team in extra-base hits with 27. He's much more likely to fuel a rally with a double than kill it with a double play. (Figgy, on the other hand has hit into 13 DP's with only 15 extra-base hits....)
Years ago, James wrote about "Secondary Average", which IIRC, really highlighted doubles and triples as power #'s. I was always fascinated by that.
Anyway...back to the thread...playing for one run means you might score one...but rarely more. Swinging aways means you'll score one just as often...and sometimes score more.
I can figure that out.
In truth, I've been listening to the "productive" out rhetoric for 40 years, and my take ...
MOST of the commentary from managers and players is "generally" intended to convey that a productive out is better than an UNPRODUCTIVE out. Basically, the 'move the runner over' out is better than whiffing, and leaving him where he is.
Nobody on the planet (that I know of), is going to (or ever has) suggested that the productive out is better than the productive NON-out.
The cloudiness is when the rhetoric falls apart when couched in terms of "purposefully" guiding a groundball to a specific fielder. In the abstract, (outside of the actual sacrifice bunt), the concept is kinda ludicrous. (If players HAD that kind of control, wouldn't they just guide the ball BETWEEN fielders?)
While many, many people get lost in the divide between lauding a result vs. suggesting a course of action ... ultimately, Wak seems to be complaining (IMO) that he simply hasn't had the opportunity to laud his boys for not screwing up WORSE. They make outs w/o moving runners over, (not surprising, since people are so rarely on base to begin with).
In truth "some" intent can be figured into an at-bat. With a man on second and none out, a hitter can be thinking about RF instead of LF ... but Seattle has been remade into a team dominated by left-hand hitters. (the term 'hitter' may be a stretch, but hey we're stuck with the context).
One of those little, (few people know) SABR tidbits that is helpful to know. The majority of INFIELD *OUTS* are pulled. The majority of OUTFIELD outs are to the opposite field.
In generic terms, you don't want Figgins TRYING to pull a ball on the ground (batting lefty) -- that just means more outs. But, you don't want him pulling the ball righty either, because that means more outs, too, (and probably more DPs).
In the end, the Ms don't suck at "productive outs" because they are or are not trying to produce them. They just suck at hitting overall.
Good points.
The vast majority of Productive Outs happen on grounders. Of course grounders also lead to GIDP. One GIDP is damaging enough to cancel around 15 productive outs.
You are really better off never worrying about productive outs unless that one run is what you think is going to decide the game.
In the abstract, (outside of the actual sacrifice bunt), the concept is kinda ludicrous. (If players HAD that kind of control, wouldn't they just guide the ball BETWEEN fielders?)
HEH!
And as y'probably know, Earl directly compared this 'ludicrous' tactic to actual sacrifice bunts.
"Even if the hitter succeeds, the runner moves over to third, but the batter is retired easily. [Hey], you might as well bunt!"
- Memorable line from Weaver On Strategy, the "If you play for one run that's all you'll get" chapter.
Would you bunt right here, Mr. Mgr? Ichiro just led off with a double, so lay one down? No, of course not?
Then don't ask Jose Lopez to take an up-and-in FB to the right side. The occasional lucky hit is more than outweighed by the popups and stuff.