Mathematically, the zero-win margin is considerably lower than the eggheads (said with love and typically including myself) have set it in calculating the value of the Mariner roster. If the Mariner team, as currently constructed is +27 to Tango's replacement level, then yes, he's talking about 48-114...(that's a .300 W%...the mark Tom uses routinely as his lower bound)...and I believe he's closer than the folks at B-Pro who use .380.
And that +27 is without Branyan, Beltre, Bedard, J. Wilson, or any replacements for part timers who'd be lost without a new contract. Since I think it is an absolute slam dunk that Branyan will be back and worth at least +2 on Tom's baseline for 6 mil, then we're really starting with having 19-20 mil to spend and already having a 77-79 win ballclub.
And as you point out, that's assuming the worst case scenario with Morrow, Fister, Vargas, Snell, Tui, Saunders, Moore and Carp.
so...77-79 wins with 85-win upside, perhaps. And 20 million to spend. That's certainly a playable position. And not a position you view with a skeptical eye regarding your playoff odds. In fact, a savvy GM who inherited 77-79 wins + 20 million + home grown upside would be THRILLED at his chances of making a few good moves and WINNING THE WORLD SERIES.
Q. Where did the consensus come from, that the Mariners need to add "twentyish" wins this winter? Add 20 wins ... to do what?
A. In this excellent article, see comment #3, which references this very fine article.
James invented Win Shares for precisely this type of roster-sketch, and the brilliant Tom Tango improved WS with his WAR concept. In the article above, a local blog offers its interpretation of where WAR points the Mariners into 2010.
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Q. SSI doesn't participate in the local blog-mention moratorium?
A. In the world of chess, the etiquette states that if you parlay another player's annotations into a derived annotation, it's an honor for the first annotator.
If Vladimir Kramnik publishes a move-by-move annotation of a Kasparov-Karpov game, all players will read the annotation with great interest. But if Vishy Anand then publishes a second annotation -- excerpting Kramnik's tactical analysis, and either endorsing or "refining" Kramnik's findings in his own calculations -- then the second annotation is usually considered more valuable. The synergy advances the quality of the material.
We take the knowledge and we kick the can down the road.
I like these two articles. That's why I'm offering my take on them. :- )
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You might visualize a couple of recommendations handed in to the desk of Marmalade-Skies GM jemanji -- the below is what I would do with these recommendations.
Next time around, we can change sides -- Dr. D could publish an analysis on, say, Tim Lincecum or Brandon Morrow or Doug Fister or Dustin Ackley or Adam Dunn, and GM Churchill could write up what he'd do with the file folder. ;- )
But supposing this information came across my desk, here's what my review would look like.
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Q. Is the original article too pessimistic?
A. There's not a thing wrong with planning for Brandon Morrow and Ian Snell to be below-average pitchers all year long, as this article does.
There is a value in being very conservative in the accounting P&L's.
We do need to realize that it's a very human prejudice in being more, or less, conservative. For a political analyst to say "I expect President Obama to gain 5% more of the Latin vote over the next two years", he is in the realm of opinion.
The value of not counting your chickens is that you challenge yourself to work harder. The danger? ... if that leads to silly decisions -- "Barack Obama needs to throw a Hail Mary pass to win this election!" -- then counting few chickens, it can become harmful.
If you're figuring Brandon Morrow as a +1.0 win pitcher -- league average would be +2.0 -- if a string of estimates like that that means you decide not to try to win the division in 2010, then you've got a problem.
If it just means you're going to try to go get more talent, then no problem.
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Q. How about the Seattle blog-o-sphere?
A. In U.S. politics, he guys who get paid huge dollars for plus/minus opinions, are the ones whose opinions have tracked as extremely prophetic, in the past.
In the baseball realm, Ron Shandler has won dozens of rotisserie trophies against the best competition around. This is based on the fact that his projections are neither conservative nor liberal, but accurate.
Pessimism and optimism are hard to get a grip on. If GM jemanji assessed a particular file as unusually cynical or hopeful, his question would be, "How has this dude done in his roto leagues? Or in his scouting signings? Or in his predictions on the last six video-game titles?"
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Q. And how does GM jemanji adjust this inflation-weighting?
A. Essentially no opinion. For the purpose of this discussion. GM jemanji doesn't have any prediction track records at all to look at.
Now, Taro, Cool Papa Bell, Mikey Jay, Justynius, Inside Pitch, I've got hard data that say they tend to call *players* more often than average.
This one, no data, really.
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The article's main point is that the Mariners have work to do -- that they shouldn't underestimate what it would take to compete with the Angels. No arguments there, amigo.
Comments
I think the key to the GM job is to eliminate black holes, while preserving the chance of being pleasantly surprised by a young players development. This is why Jack Wilson is likely to be back, because what is the pleasant surprise scenario at SS? We have one at third, we have one in LF, but we are barren in the middle infield. You could make the argument that we have a chance of being pleasantly surprised at first base/DH with Carp, but I think the benefit of getting a moderately priced MLB hitter like Branyan or Nick Johnson out weighs the risk of blocking Lahair and Carp. If you want to sign Beltre or his equivalent, the cost in years and dollars is much higher. That is why you give Tui more of an opportunity than you give Carp.
On the pitching side, I would entertain offers to Sheets, Bedard, and Harden, with Harden being my first choice. Note that batters made contact on only 67.3% of their swings against Harden, lowest in the majors for starting pitchers (batters made contact on 77% of pitches against Felix, for instance).
Mount Everett, 2,624 ft (800 m), is the highest peak in the south Taconic Mountains of Massachusetts. Mount Everest, 29,029 ft (8,848 m), is the highest mountain on earth. =========== Before climbing any mountain, one needs to have a reasonable idea of how difficult the task happens to be. I REALLY liked Dave's article, because not only is the math top-notch, but he doesn't pull any punches in noting how VERY hard it would be to gain the 15-20 wins (assuming a 75-87 starting point), with $25 million to spend. The math of FA says wins on the FA market typically cost $4-5 mil. What that implies is that an "average" GM, with $25 million to spend on re-signs and acquisitions, should be able to add 5-6 wins. That puts a .500ish team back on the field in 2010. Not what anyone wants, (including Z, I'm sure). To do better than that *ANY* GM is going to have to be exceptional. But, Doc is right to note that, (by itself), is not reason to not try. I applaud Doc's tenacity in continuing to hit that point ... that difficulty of task is not an excuse to not try. BUT ... the nuance of the stellar GM compared to the hack is not that they are trying to win or not, (they're ALL trying to win - with different restrictions). The difference is HOW. The problem I see is viewing going with youngsters as NOT trying. That very clearly is not the case. Detroit went with youngsters, and in 2 years was in the series. The Marlins have gone with youngsters and have two WS wins in their short history. The Phillies FAILED repeatedly to win anything while acquiring free agents yearly ... took a step back and got younger, and BAM! They have a title. ===== The Doc likes Dunn. Hey, I like Dunn. I think he'd be a nice asset for just about any team. But I completely and utterly without reservation disagree with the concept that he's an absolute X number of wins better than Carp. NOBODY knows how many wins Carp will or will not bring. In his first full season, Dunn posted an .854 OPS, and has a .903 OPS for his career. Carp's career avg at this point is .878. That certainly doesn't mean that's what he's going to hit in 2010. But, there is absolutely nothing (other than Doc's view of 'clunky' hitting), that negates the possibility of an .800+ OPS for Carp. Even just looking at hitting, ignoring defense completely, Carp looks ALREADY capable of bringing a Mark Grace type bat, for essentially zero cost. Exactly how low is your projection of Carp, Doc? But, what gets lost in this is the whole question of Branyan, who wore down and got hurt. Why? Because it didn't take long to figure out that Sweeney simply couldn't take the field any more without getting hurt himself. I don't know how good or bad Carp is defensively, but I have a pretty good read on Dunn. And, if you get Dunn, then your defensive flexibility (other than being able to severely impair your defense regularly), almost certainly takes a hit. The problem here is that there is an error in thinking the choice for DH does NOT impact the defensive side of things. If you have a complete defensive black hole at DH, it DOES impact the defense elsewhere, because you're forced to make other roster moves and lineup decisions that can cascade. Carrying Griffey and Sweeney as immobile DHes is exactly what led to Burke playing first base for a game ... and it's what part of what led to Ronny Cedeno getting way too much playing time. The club didn't have the OPTION to carry a better bat on the bench for most of the season because they had no CHOICE but to focus on magic-glove guys who could play anywhere. Even if Dunn never steps onto the field defensively, that choice WILL have an impact on the defense. The difficulty is in assessing how much. In short, opting to go with Tui and Carp and Saunders does not by itself say "we're playing for next year". If you believe in those guys, then you can easily view playing them as going for it just as much as acquiring Dunn or Nick Johnson. BUT, going with Tui and Carp, et al, means you've got money to do OTHER things. Maybe you go out and buy a better bullpen. Maybe you opt to bring in a veteran SP for the rotation. There are TONS of options for "going for it" that don't absolutely demand sinking major money into bats. In 2009, the club outscored the opponent in 3 months, they were outscored in 3 months. The 3 months where they actually generated a positive pythag were the months they ALLOWED the fewest runs. The worst pythag months were the ones they scored the most. I'm not saying that getting Dunn is a horrible choice. But, I'm saying there are dozens of scenarios where Dunn "could" be a horrible choice, and dozens where he'd be an excellent choice. The problem here is that ORDER matters. If you go and sign Dunn FIRST, the cost likely restricts everything else that follows. If you try to line other things up with a Dunn-signing as the coup de grace, if he goes elsewhere ... oh, well. Lots of these speculations are built on the foundation of belief that certain guys WILL sign, (they may not), and that certain guys will sign for certain prices, (they may not). The pink elephant in the room is that there are only three regular positions that are "sure things" -- Lopez, Ichiro, Gutz for the 2010 roster. You could include catcher in that mix, with a reasonable assumption that there is no chance the club will be going external to get a catcher, (even though the final choices between Joh, Johnson and Moore create a type of uncertainty there). For 2010, the team has to DECIDE on DH, 1B, 3B, SS, LF. *ANY* of those 5 positions could be someone new. (Which is why I continue to twitch each time I hear "trade Lopez" - heck, he's probably the only reasonably projectable returning hitter on the team!). You've got $25 million to fill 5 starting spots in your lineup, PLUS hopefully improving the bullpen, AND strengthening the rotation. Matt suggests that for a $5 million increase in payroll, you get Branyan back. Fair enough. But, what I'm failing to follow is how it is that the ENTIRE FOUNDATION for this exercise is that on the FA market, 1 win costs $4-$5 million, but when we get to 77-79 wins and $20 million, it's suddenly being viewed as semi-obvious that it's doable. In point of fact, the very math that the entire argument is based on says it is NOT doable. 77-79 win, plus $20 million gets you to 82-84 wins. But, they have to be GOOD moves is the obvious response. Well, Branyan, Gut, Sweeney and Aardsma were good moves. Z has proven he can make good moves. Cedeno, Endy, Olson, Vargas, French were not so good moves, (result-wise). And what of the trio of obvious returnees? Two had career highs in almost every stat, while the third, (Ichiro), had his best season in 5 years, and turns 36 in 2010. Can they repeat 2009? Sure. What are the odds and projections? EVEN if the club goes out and signs someone like Dunn, the ultimate story of the offense STILL will rest on how well guys like Tui and Saunders and Moore and Carp do with their playing time, (however it is divided). Should Z be TRYING to win in 2010? Absolutely. But, the actual odds and difficulty in getting Branyanesque deals with similar production at 4 or 5 different positions is going to require copious amounts of luck. But, the real genius of 2009 was NOT that he got Branyan and Guti -- the genius was that he got them with almost zero downside. Heading INTO 2009, Z didn't sign ANYONE for multiple years. Gutz and Ardsmaa are both arb-year guys, and Branyan and Sweeney and Griffey were all single year rentals. The idea of spending $20 million ***ONLY*** in 2010 is a wonderful concept. But, the reality is that you aren't likely to land someone like Dunn on a 1-year. (It's possible -- especially if waiting for the market to change -- but not likely). In truth, it is practically impossible to make a really bad mistake on any 1-year contract. You get an immediate do-over, and can often move to fix something mid-season. The big mistakes to be made involve multi-year deals, and typically the good/bad can only be assessed after the entire run of the deal. Snell actually kind of becomes the first Z multi-year deal. Though even that is about as minimalist as one could get in regards to a multi-year deal. Eventually, every GM has to sign multi-year deals. So, the question is not JUST do you sink money into trying to win in 2010, but how much are you committing to 2011 and 2012? Without the $20 million sunk into Silva and Joh, Z would have $40 million to play with, and then the math gets a LOT juicier for getting to the 95 win projection. My preference would be to play tight, go for a repeat of 2009 ... find a couple of 1-year hungry diamonds in the rough and hope the farm produces -- and plan for a cash reserve ready to go strong after a deadline acquisition, when you've got a better read on the development of Tui, Carp, Moore, Snell, Fister, etc. If you can get a major talent on a cheap 1-year deal, (be it Dunn or Bedard), by all means do it. I just believe that if the club is going to become a franchise that can SUSTAIN success, you cannot become monofocused on the current season. The base is simply not quite strong enough. There's zero evidence that Jack can correctly assess pitching talent on the open market, (yet). Was he just unlucky with Olson, Vargas and French or is his paradigm busted? There's still much for the franchise to learn about ITSELF. Not saying to sacrifice 2010 for 2011. Just saying *GOOD* franchises never forget to CONSIDER the impacts both short and long.
So, yeah. If +27 WAR pencils to 75 wins per Fangraphs / Tango, fine.
There's one slip 'twixt the cup and the lip, if our spreadsheet winds up projecting a Branyan-less Mariner team to 87 losses. Anybody notice what it is? :- )
isn't something captured by the spreadsheet.
What happens when Hargrove has a hole to fill? When Wakamatsu does? What performance does either get from the problem spots in the roster?
From the 2-D paradigm of a WAR spreadsheet, the difference between Wok's and Grover's skill set is one of the 3-D spaces that a fly's eyes can't see.
...that the current team had 85 wins...and Branyan certainly wasn't worth 8 of them. :)
...it just hasn't been studied. The statistically minded have tended to start with the player and a set of assumptions about the forces that govern his performance...studies of managerial performance have been limited and very simplistic. That doesn't mean we can't figure something out eventually.
And the September team *was* the 75-87 ballclub, right? The one without Branyan? Anybody see the Angels, Rangers, Yankees series?
Math is fine, but there are a lot of moving parts in real life, and this 75-87 team just had a test run. This test run should be taken into consideration.
You don't have fluid options right now ... hence the big outlay for Wilson with his drawbacks...
Major coup this year, to bring in a Scutaro type... but if you are hamstringing yourself with the absolute that your SS *must* be one of the top 10 gloves in the game, you are going to pay a serious premium...
Here, thanks