1
My perception is it's a toss up between Upton and Walker on bring the best player in that trade. Many people seem to be of the impression that Walker is hands down better, but I don't think it's that clear.
Best Player In the Deal
The market seems to be correcting itself this winter
.
Q. How would SSI calculate the "correct" prospect load for a Justin Upton deal?
A. My considered opinion is that these kinds of prospect-for-star trades are (normally) far too complicated to "solve" with math.
.
Q. Upton's contract will underpay him by $20-40M, depending on your projection for his WAR. Taijuan and Franklin project to be underpaid by about $28-45M, total for both, during their first six years. That's sound enough, right?
A. We wouldn't use batting average alone to evaluate trades of position players, and for similar reasons, we can't use this paradigm alone to evaluate the Upton deal.
BUT! The profit comparison is important. You would not want to be ignorant of what this calculation says. Having the "surplus value" charts is necessary for these trades. If you weren't aware of what the numbers said, you would be derelict.
.
Q. First of all: let's see the prime facie case. What does the paradigm say?
A. Here are the charts.
Fangraphs' calculations -- see this article -- are based on paying $5-6 million per WAR, as teams have (usually) actually had to do in the free agent market.
The $40M for Upton factors in an additional $4M worth of value for either (1) a possible draft pick compensation or (2) a discounted extension. Those assumptions are not very reliable, but this article (again) does a great job of acknowledging the unreliable nature of the calculations.
| Player | On-field value | Salary | Profit |
| Upton | $75-80 million | $38 M | ~$40 M |
| TOTAL | ~$40 M | ||
| Taijuan | ~28 M | ||
| Franklin | ~$17 M | ||
| Furbush | ? | ||
| Pryor | ? | ||
| TOTAL | ~$60 M |
.
And here's a similar calculation by one of the crack posters over yonder at Lookout Landing:
Based on either Victor Wang’s original research or Pirates’ Prospects updated version. Walker was BA’s number 20 prospect last year and Franklin was 77; that gives:
1) Wang’s figures
Top 11-25 pitcher = $15.9m
Top 76-100 hitter = $12.5m2) Pirates’ Prospects figures
Top 11-25 pitcher = $18.89m
Top 76-100 hitter = $10.43mEither way that’s about $28m; then you probably need to adjust Franklin’s value for the good year he’s just had that could move him into or close to the top 50, which would add another $5m or so to give $33m. Add Pryor and Furbush and you’re probably up around $40m, maybe more depending on how reliable you think Furbush’s breakout is.
If Upton is only going to provide 11.5 WAR in the next three years and we’re not getting anyone else back, this looks like a serious overpay. If he’s something closer to the MVP-level player he was in 2011 – say, 5 WAR/year – it looks decent.
There's a key factor we have to add in at this point, however ...
.
Q. It looks clear that the M's would have been overpaying, right? You've got $20-40M for Upton and $40-60M for the M's prospects.
A. The method isn't sound, not at all, because Upton provides his $20-40M in surplus value WITHIN ONE ROSTER SLOT. The other four players give the $40-60M surplus BUT THE PLAYERS OCCUPY FOUR ROSTER SLOTS TO DO THIS.
It's not a lot different from saying, "Hey, we gave you four 12-point players for LeBron James. We overpaid by 22 points a game."
.
Q. So how does SSI run the math?
A. Here's a chart that DOES capture the idea of Stars & Scrubs. These aren't random numbers; they're actually best guesses.
| Player | On-field value | Salary | Profit |
| Upton | $75-80 M | $38 | ~$40 M |
| SP5 (Hultzen) | ~$28M | ||
| SS (Miller) | ~17 M | ||
| MR (Capps, whoever) | ~8 M | ||
| MR | ~6 M | ||
| TOTAL, UPTON + 3 PLAYERS | $120 M | ||
| Taijuan | $28 M | ||
| Franklin | $17 M | ||
| Pryor | ~8 M | ||
| Furbush | ~6 M | ||
| TOTAL, TAIJUAN / FRANKLIN | $60M |
So when we change the paradigm -- Upton plus 3 young players on the 25-man roster, against 4 players who would have been on our roster -- suddenly, we wayyyyyyyyy underpaid.
And here you had sportswriters asking if it should cost Zduriencik his job, to pay such exciting young prospects for an established ML star.
.
Q. Okay then ... is YOUR calculation sound?
A. It is not.
:- )
For instance ... did you remember that Upton will be providing his $40M surplus value within three calendar years? So you'll have three other calendar years in which a young player can tack on even more "profit."
There are many, many other confounding variables here also.
.
Q. Such as?
A. We replaced a $28M Taijuan with a $28M Danny Hultzen -- here, by the way, is where we get that $28M figure from. Guys just went back and counted up how much "profit" there has been with pitchers and hitters who make Baseball America's top 100.
That's pretty much in the ballpark. Take ten players ranked super high by BBA, and paid minimum wage at the start of their careers. Of course you're going to get a lot of profit. $28M average, for guys like Taijuan, Hultzen, Paxton, and Erasmo, that sounds about right.
Anyway, slamming in Hultzen for Taijuan makes it look like you haven't lost anything .... actually, you have. You've lost a draw at the deck. Suppose there is a 70% chance that any given ML-ready pitcher stays healthy ... well, then, you've got a 91% chance that ONE OF TWO such pitchers stays healthy. You "paid" that marginal 21% chance of injury, though it doesn't show up in the chart.
..........
There are lots of variables ... and realistically?, if you have four Clayton Kershaws you're not going to "waste" any of them. You'd use them all, or you'd trade one to get back Lou Gehrig, or something. If the M's kept all of the Big Four, they'd phase them in, and extract a lot of their value even though they overlap.
Still, you only have five starters. SOMEWHERE there's a guy who's the 26th man on the roster. :- ) If you used Victor Wang's method to evaluate all of the M's young pheenoms you'd have like $300M of profit. Every time you put a young player on the roster, you're pushing out some kid who also had a lot of value.
.
Q. Okay, there are no real answers, mathematically. Leaving us where?
A. One thing we know: when you cram extra value into the top slots on your roster, THAT is value you will actually be able to exploit.
Justin Upton figures to return his team about $40M in profit value over the next three years, from approximately the #4 or #5 slot on the 25-man roster. That $10-15M per year, from a top-5 slot, is what roster config is all about.
.
Q. The market has been way down for prospects this winter, true. People went nuts over the Myers/Shields deal.
A. If I didn't know better, I'd honestly think that back channel, somebody circulated a memo this winter. And it clarified all of the GM's about these Stars & Scrubs concepts.
I know how weird that sounds. But all of a sudden, the entire industry seems to be taking these things into account.
You know what really blows me away? The DBacks making sure to get back Charlie Furbush and Stephen Pryor. They got back ML players, ML impact players, with the prospect bundle. Think about it.
.
Q. How much is too much? By this logic you might give eight young players for a Star, or fifteen of them. That can't be right.
A. Don't be so sure. You could give 15 Willie Bloomquists for one Mike Trout, and be glad you did. Even if Willie were an 0.8 WAR player, you could give 20 of him for Mike Trout. It's because of this "25 Man Roster" concept. The cutoff at #26 comes back to bite you again and again.
One thing Dr. D knows. The market needs a correction, as far as how many prospects equal one Giancarlo Stanton. When you're in doubt, pay more prospects than people think you should.
There are more prospects where Nick Franklin came from. And you only get to select a few of them to actually put on the field. So GET BACK THE BEST PLAYER IN THE DEAL, babe.
BABVA,
Dr D