Good read, as usual, from Geoff Baker on the fact that the M's are moving runners over less often than other teams.
We especially like Geoff's clear, clean writing as it pertains to (low) assumption of audience knowledge. He starts by explaining the difference between RISP and productive outs, and does so without conveying any impatience about having to do so.
Even when I know a subject like the back of my hand, I still prefer for a writer/speaker to use low assumption-of-knowledge. It helps me get my bearings quickly and hop up the ladder to more-organized thinking.
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Q. Are the Mariners scoring fewer runs and losing more games because they are "poor" at moving runners over with productive outs?
A. No way no how. At least, not in principle.
As any run-expectancy chart -- say, this run expectancy chart -- will tell you, a ballclub moves itself closer to a loss by grounding the ball to the right side, man on 2B and 0 out. Thusly:
- 0 on, man on 2B = 119 runs per 100 innings
- 1 on, man on 3B = 98 runs per 100 innings
We don't know how to make it any simpler than that. If the defense could make that swap every time 0 on, man on 2B occurred, it would save dozens of runs a year and win several more ballgames than it does.
Ceteris perebus, Dr. Lasker, a hitter who grounds out 4-3 and advances a runner is shooting his ballclub in the side of the head.
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Ya, we know that the run-scoring environments are a bit different now than in 1998-2002, and no, they're not enough to overthrow the underlying principles.
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Q. Why do teams believe in it, then? Baker suggests that good teams move runners over a lot. Doesn't SSI believe in manager intuition?
A. Two reasons, a minor one and a major one. The minor reason is: the first 100 years of MLB had much lower run-scoring environments, in which one run mattered much more often. The principle evolved in Asia, before we moved to Australia.
The major reason in a moment...
Manager intuition, by the way, is generally correct. But Earl Weaver, and many others, were screaming against the 4-3 groundout 40 years ago. And Miller Huggins never asked Babe Ruth or Lou Gehrig to move runners over.
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Geoff reports that failure to make productive outs is one of the things that is angering Don Wakamatsu right now:
What we're talking about here, and what frustrates manager Don Wakamatsu, is situational hitting. Because if you get a guy to third base with only one out, there are ways to score that runner without a hit.
You can hit a flyball and have the runner tag up. Hit a ground ball to the right side. You can put a squeeze play on. The flyball can often be the easiest way, which is why you'll see sinkerballers so effective late. In those cases, the offensive team can put a "contact play" on where the runner breaks for home on contact and will usually score if the ball is hit anywhere but third base.
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Q. Do other base/out situations merit the "productive out"?
A. Get a load of this one. If a ballclub led off with a triple, would it benefit from a sacrifice fly (SF) on the next play?
- 0 out, man on 3B = 148 runs per 100 innings
- 1 out, bases empty, and 1 run already cashed in = 130 runs per 100 innings
You just shot yourself in the foot again!
Weaver's Fourth Law: If You Play For One Run, That's All You Get. Don't go squandering your outs on single bases. You OPS .500 that way. (Well, y'know.)
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Q. Other situations?
A. With a runner on 3B, and 1 out, you actually do gain 0.14 runs by hitting a sac fly:
- 1 out, man on 3B = 98 runs per 100 innings
- 2 out, bases empty, and 1 run already cashed in = 112 runs per 100 innings.
The difference between this situation, and the previous one, is interesting. Maybe Matty can comment on why the math works the way it does, that giving up the out works with 1 out but not with none out.
But, in general, trading an out for a base -- even for home plate -- is doing the other team a favor.
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