Purchased on July 25th, 2009, giving him about 2 months of service time.

FWIW.

I understand the position that one might not want to audition 3 potentials into a lineup at the same time.  That is a LOT of unknown.  But, the position is one based on underlying pessimism.  "We can afford to try out one guy at a time, because if he fails, the other 8 pick up the slack, and we win anyway."

The problem with this view is it based on the perceived "guarantee" coming from non-prospects.   The club, in 2009 was "guaranteed" of standard performance out of Beltre as much as any player.  They didn't get it.  There's risk of injury with every player.  There is risk of collapse with every player.  You don't have to a 32-year-old slugger to suddenly go south.  It happens.  (Go follow the Fernando Tatis saga for an example).

The problem with the 1-at-a-time prospect approach is that there is also a likely assumption that the club will "select" the most-likely-to-succeed prospect to get the audition.  That is, unfortunately, not how it works.  The club HAS to have someone playing every position.  If they can get a cheap, quality bat at 1B, then maybe the most-likely guy gets to repeat AAA, while the less-likely 3B or LF gets his shot.

My view is that EVERY prospect carries basically the same risk -- "either we're right - or we're wrong".  You don't promote "just because" a player turns 25.  You promote because you think he's ready -- or because you don't think continuing to face AAA competition is going to be very helpful. 

If a club thinks it has a 1B, 3B and LF *all* ready to audition for the bigs, then they HURT THEMSELVES by only giving one a tryout.  They are hurt immediately financially, having to pay more for that "MLB proven" bat.  They are hurt by potentially surrendering a year of MLB development for said prospect.  If they HAVE learned what they can in AAA, then sending them back for another year doesn't help them -- and WHATEVER their learning curve is going to be against MLB competition, you've just pushed that back a year.

The optimistic view is not "what if they fail".  The optimist says, "what if they succeed?"  What if one of them turns out to be WAY better than we thought, and the other two are immediately MLB serviceable?  In THAT scenario, you've got a LOT more available cash to plug in other holes.  You also have side-effects.  They are home-grown, which is a boost to the morale of the scouts who suggested them -- the coaches who coached them -- the players they played with in the minors who go, "gee, if he made it, maybe so can I".

Of course, every situation is unique.  It depends on the talent of the prospects - the talent of the potential vets to block them.  The available payroll.  There isn't one right answer.  But answer me this.  After the 2003 season, (hindsight being 20/20), would the club been better served by dumping vets and acquiring some prospects - or doing what they did -- going out and getting guys like Spezio, and Aurillio?  Hindsight says betting on the vets was a bad, bad, bad bet.  But, when you bet on prospects and lose, the "assumption" is that betting on vets would've been better.  It's untrue -- and the Seattle 2004 season is the proof of that reality.

In fact, bringing up multiple prospects seems to have a multiplying effect -- where having multiple rookies allows them to share a similar experience and reduce the edge off being THE big name prospect.  What I really wonder, however, is how much the perception would've changed if the 2009 Ms had won only 79 games, instead of the 85 they did.  I think - EXACTLY LIKE 2007 - that many are viewing the 2009 club as closer to the post-season then they really were.  And I can hear the knee-jerk defenses raising for all the reasons that the two cannot be comped.  But, it's not the TEAMS I'm comping.  It's the reaction to the results I'm comping.  Win 88, pythag 79 -- "but, we're really better than that."  win 85, pythag 75, "but, we're really better than that."  It is the EXACT same reaction - and the only difference in the reaction is the list of potential rationalizations to wield to ignore the similarity in situations.